Context: A Housing Crisis Older Than Its Politics

New York City’s housing crisis is not new, and it is not mysterious. It is the product of decades of underbuilding, financialization of housing assets, and zoning regimes that privileged market-rate development while steadily eroding tenant stability. By the time rent burdens and displacement reached emergency levels in the 2010s, the city was already operating with a deeply constrained set of tools.

Public housing stock had deteriorated. Rent regulation had been weakened and only partially restored. Private capital dominated development decisions, while municipal government retained responsibility for the social consequences of those decisions.

In this environment, housing policy debates often collapsed into false binaries. Either market-led development would eventually trickle affordability downward, or any intervention that constrained investor returns would halt construction altogether. Both positions treated tenants as variables rather than constituents.

The City for All framework emerged as a response to this stalemate. Its premise was not that the city could immediately resolve the housing crisis, but that it could rebalance incentives, redirect capital, and restore tenant power within existing political and fiscal constraints.

Tiffany Cabán: From Defense to Governance

Tiffany Cabán’s path into housing policy did not begin with zoning. It began in the criminal legal system.

Before her election to the New York City Council, Cabán worked as a public defender, representing people whose encounters with the state were shaped by poverty, housing instability, and over-policing. Evictions, shelter stays, and overcrowded apartments were not abstractions in this work. They were upstream drivers of incarceration, family separation, and economic precarity.

Elected to represent District 22 in Queens as part of a broader progressive wave, Cabán entered office with a constituency facing rising rents, landlord harassment, and limited access to stable, affordable housing. Her alignment with NYC-DSA placed her within a cohort of council members who approached housing as infrastructure rather than a commodity.

That orientation shaped how she engaged with citywide housing negotiations. The goal was not symbolic resistance to development, but leverage inside a system that overwhelmingly favored private capital.

The Scale of the Problem, Stated Plainly

Any serious housing intervention in New York City must contend with scale.

The city’s capital budget alone runs into the tens of billions annually. Housing development timelines span years, often decades. Zoning changes affect land values, investor behavior, and neighborhood composition long after votes are cast.

Against that backdrop, the City for All housing package emerged during negotiations over the mayor’s broader City of Yes zoning proposal. Moderates framed City of Yes as a supply-side reform intended to unlock development. Tenant advocates warned that without binding affordability and reinvestment commitments, zoning changes would accelerate displacement.

The socialist caucus did not have veto power. What it had was leverage, numbers, and the ability to slow or condition passage.

Negotiating the $5 Billion Commitment

The $5 billion figure attached to City for All did not appear spontaneously. It was the product of negotiation inside a council divided between pro-development moderates and tenant-aligned progressives.

DSA-backed council members, including Cabán, tied their support for zoning reforms to a set of concrete concessions. These included:

• A multi-year capital commitment for affordable and public housing investment, totaling approximately $5 billion.
• Stronger tenant protections linked to zoning changes, including funding for preservation of existing affordable units.
• Explicit prioritization of working-class and deeply affordable housing rather than reliance on market-rate inclusionary formulas alone.

Moderates resisted these conditions, arguing that additional requirements would deter development and slow housing production. The counterargument from the socialist caucus was not ideological. It was empirical. Decades of upzoning without adequate tenant safeguards had failed to produce affordability at scale.

The eventual agreement reflected compromise. Zoning reforms moved forward. The capital commitment was secured. Neither side received everything it wanted.

Where the Money Goes, and Where It Does Not

The $5 billion secured through City for All is not a single check written to a single program. It is a capital allocation spread across multiple housing initiatives, including:

• Construction and preservation of affordable housing units.
• Investment in public housing repairs and modernization.
• Support for tenant-controlled and social housing models.
• Financing mechanisms intended to reduce reliance on speculative private development.

This matters because housing outcomes are shaped as much by where money is directed as by how much is allocated. Capital spent preserving existing units often prevents displacement more effectively than new construction alone. Investments in social housing alter ownership structures, not just unit counts.

At the same time, limits are real. Capital commitments do not guarantee immediate delivery. Land availability, construction costs, and administrative capacity constrain outcomes. Some funds remain unspent or delayed as projects move through planning and approval stages.

Opposition, Friction, and Concessions

The City for All package faced opposition from multiple directions.

Real estate interests warned that added conditions would chill investment. Some centrist council members argued that tying zoning reform to spending commitments set a precedent that could stall future policy efforts. Budget hawks questioned long-term fiscal sustainability.

The socialist caucus conceded on scope and timeline. The package did not create a fully independent social housing authority. It did not mandate universal rent control. It did not halt private development.

What it did achieve was structural. It embedded tenant priorities into zoning negotiations that had historically excluded them. It forced capital commitments into conversations that typically revolved around density alone.

Community Impact Beyond Generic Claims

The benefits of City for All are uneven and ongoing. Claims of resolution would be inaccurate.

What can be observed is increased funding flow toward preservation and affordability, particularly in working-class districts facing acute displacement pressure. Tenant organizations report improved leverage in negotiations with landlords tied to city-funded projects. Public housing repair backlogs have not disappeared, but capital injections have stabilized some developments that were approaching failure.

These outcomes are not evenly distributed. They are contingent on implementation quality, agency coordination, and sustained political attention.

Batting Average as a Housing Metric

Housing policy does not lend itself to clean success stories. Units take years to come online. Displacement happens faster than construction. Market forces respond immediately to signals, while public systems move slowly.

This is why batting average matters more than absolutes.

Does more capital flow toward non-market housing than before. Are more tenants protected from displacement than under prior frameworks. Is the balance of power shifting, even marginally, toward residents rather than investors.

By those measures, City for All represents improvement rather than transformation. The housing crisis remains severe. Rents remain high. Homelessness persists.

But the trajectory has shifted. Tenant protections are no longer an afterthought. Capital commitments are now part of zoning negotiations. Socialist council members have demonstrated that leverage can be exercised without derailing governance.

What This Case Adds to the Record

Tiffany Cabán’s role in City for All does not offer a blueprint that resolves New York City’s housing crisis. It offers something more modest and more credible.

It shows that progressive governance can operate inside hostile systems, negotiate with capital rather than simply oppose it, and secure material gains without claiming final victory.

Like the Chicago and Los Angeles cases, it documents upward movement rather than completion. In a political environment dominated by overpromising and underdelivery, that distinction matters.